Cryptanalysis of Sun and Cao's Remote Authentication Scheme with User
  Anonymity by Mishra, Dheerendra
ar
X
iv
:1
31
0.
64
22
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
3 A
pr
 20
14
Cryptanalysis of Sun and Cao’s Remote
Authentication Scheme with User Anonymity
Dheerendra Mishra∗
Department of Mathematics,
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur,
Kharagpur 721302, India
Abstract
Dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes ensure effi-
cient and anonymous mutual authentication between entities. In 2013,
Khan et al. proposed an improved dynamic ID-based authentication
scheme to overcome the security flaws of Wang et al.’s authentication
scheme. Recently, Sun and Cao showed that Khan et al. does not
satisfies the claim of the user’s privacy. Moreover, They proposed an
efficient authentication scheme with user anonymity. The Sun and
Cao’s scheme achieve improvement over Khan et al.’s scheme in both
privacy and performance point of view. Unfortunately, we identify
that Sun and Cao’s scheme does not resist password guessing attack.
Additionally, Sun and Cao’s scheme does not achieve forward secrecy.
keywords: Smart card; Remote user authentication; Anonymity.
1 Introduction
Advancement in technology has provided a scalable platform for various on-
line services. In these services, a user access the remote servers via a public
channel. However, an adversary is considered powerful enough that he can
intercept, modify, delete and replace the messages, which transmits via pub-
lic channel. This increase the threats to data security and integrity. One of
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the countermeasure is remote user authentication protocols [3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11].
Most of the existing remote user authentication schemes ensure mutual au-
thentication and session key agreement where the user and the server can
mutually authenticate each other and draw a session key.
To achieve efficient and secure remote user services, low-cost smart card
based authentication protocol has been presented to achieve a scalable so-
lution. Most of the existing smart card based schemes face various kinds of
attacks such as insider attack, password guessing attack, man-in-the middle
attack, impersonation attack, repay attack and many more. Moreover, user
anonymity is usually not protected [1, 12]. In 2009, Wang et al. [15] pre-
sented an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication
scheme to achieve authorized and anonymous communication. However, in
2011, Khan et al. [7] identified the flaws in Wang et al.’s scheme and pro-
posed and improvement to remove these flaws. In recently published paper,
Sun and Cao’s demonstrated that Khan et al.’s dynamic ID-based remote
user authentication scheme claim to provide user anonymity is failing as an
adversary can track any legitimate user’s identity by eavesdropping on the
mutual authentication session over the public channel. Additionally, they
proposed an improved scheme and claimed that their scheme is reasonable
in privacy, security and performance aspect.
In this article, we analyze the security of Sun and Cao’s smart card based
remote user authentication scheme. We identify that Sun and Cao’s scheme
is vulnerable to the password guessing attack. Moreover, we present the
inefficiency of Sun and Cao’s scheme to ensure forward secrecy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the
meaning of symbols that are used in this paper. The brief review of Sun and
Cao’s scheme is given in Section 3. Section 4 demonstrates the flaws in Sun
and Cao’s scheme. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 5.
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2 Notations
Table 1: Meaning of symbols of used notations that used throughout the
paper
Notation Descryption
Ui User i
S A trustworthy server
IDi Unique identity of user i
PWi Unique password of user i
N Registration time of user
TU Timestamp generated by Ui
TS Timestamp generated by S
sk Session key
x Master key of S
h(·) & h1(·) One-way hash functions
⊕ XOR
|| String concatenation operation
3 Review of Sun and Cao’s Scheme
In 2013, Sun and Cao [14] proposed an improvement of Khan et al.’s scheme [7]
dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme. This comprises fol-
lowing phases:
a. Registration phase
b. Login Phase
c. Authentication Phase
d. Lost smart card revocation Phase
In this section, we will briefly discuss registration, Login and authentica-
tion phases of Sun and Cao’s scheme as we only analyzes these phases in our
study.
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3.1 Registration Phase
A new user can register with the server and gets the personalized smart card
as follows:
Step 1. Ui chooses his identity IDi and password PWi, and generates a
random number r. Then, he computes RPW = h(r||PWi) and sends
the message < IDi, RPW > to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the registration request, S verifies the credentials of
IDi and checks whether IDi exist or not in its database. If IDi exist
and registers with any other user, it asks new identity. Otherwise, if Ui
does not exist in the server’s database, S computes J = h(x||IDi||N)
and L = J ⊕ RPW , where N is the number of times U registered.
Then, S embeds {L} into smart card and secretly issues the smart
card to S.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, Ui stores r into the smart card.
3.2 Login Phase
When a user wants to login to the server, he inserts his smart card into the
card reader and inputs the identity IDi and password PWi, then login phase
works as follows:
Step 1. The smart card computes RPW = h(r||PWi) and J = L⊕RPW .
Step 2. The smart card computes C1 = h1(J ||TU). Then Ui sends M1 =<
C1, TU > to S.
3.3 Authentication Phase
When server S receives the login message, then server verifies the authenticity
of the user. The user also verifies the server authenticity as follows:
Step 1. Upon receiving U ’s message M1, S verifies the validity of times-
tamp TU . If TU is incorrect, it terminates the session. Otherwise, S
searches IDi among stored identities by verifying the condition C1 =
? h1(h(x||IDi||N)||TU). If IDi verification does not hold for any iden-
tity of the database, S terminates the login session. Otherwise, S ac-
cepts the login request.
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Step 2. S computes C2 = h1(h(x||IDi||N)||C1||TS). Then, S sends the
message M2 =< C2, TS > to Ui. Moreover, S computes the session key
sk = h1(J ||C2).
Step 3. Upon receiving the message M2, Ui verifies the timestamp TS. If
the verification does not hold, it ends the session. Otherwise, it verifies
C2 =? h1(J ||C1||TS). If verification does not succeed, the session ter-
minated. Otherwise, S is authenticated and session key sk = h1(J ||C2)
is computed.
4 SecurityWeaknesses of Sun and Cao’s Scheme
4.1 Off-line password guessing attack
The password guessing attack is the one of the most common attack on
password based authentication protocols using smart card. An adversary
can perform password guessing attack on Sun and Cao’s scheme as follows:
Step 1. Guess the password PW ∗
i
, and compute RPW ∗ = h(PW ∗
i
||r) and
J∗ = L⊕ RPW ∗.
Step 2. Verify the condition C1 =? h1(J
∗||TU).
Step 3. If the verification holds, the guessing of passwords is succeeding.
Otherwise, repeat Step 1 and Step 2.
4.2 Forward secrecy
In Sun and Cao’s scheme, the session key sk is the hashed output of user’s
long term secret key J along with C2, i.e. sk = h1(J ||C2). This shows that
Sun and Cao’s scheme doe not ensure forward secrecy, as a compromise of
user’s long term secret key J causes compromise of all the established session
keys. This is possible as follows:
• An adversary can achieve all the previously transmitted message via
public channel, i.e, an adversary can achieve C2.
• The adversary can compute the session key sk = h1(J ||C2).
5
5 Conclusion
An efficient password based remote user authentication scheme should resist
all kinds of attack. In this article, we have demonstrated that Sun and Cao’s
privacy preserving remote user authentication scheme is vulnerable to off-line
password guessing attack and fails to ensure forward secrecy.
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